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NOTES
does not eliminate . . . or modify the limitations on picketing at the site
of a primary labor dispute that are now in existing law" and then cites
Moore Dry Dock and Washington Coca Cola as examples. Perhaps the
District of Columbia and Fifth Circuits will now feel compelled to adopt
the reasoning of these cases as the legislative will of Congress. In sum-
mary, it seems fairly clear that the pre-19 5 9 Board and court decisions
regarding common situs picketing will continue to be the controlling
precedent under the new Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
RECOGNITION OF GAIN ON THE SALE OF REALTY-
THE CLOSED TRANSACTION TEST
When a taxpayer sells real property and receives the full consider-
ation in the same taxable year, there is, of course, no doubt as to when
his gain or loss will be recognized for federal income tax purposes. This
is true whether the taxpayer uses the cash or accrual method of reporting
his income.' However, where the receipt of the consideration by the
seller is extended over more than one taxable year by periodic deferred
payments, and the sale does not qualify for, or the taxpayer does not
elect, 2 the special treatment under the installment method,' the cases
appear conflicting and confused as to when the gain should be reported.
The confusion arises mainly in the case of an individual, cash-basis tax-
payer who sells his home or other real property under a simple land
contract. He may be forced to recognize his total gain for income tax
purposes before it has been actually realized.
There is no express statutory authority for the use of a deferred-
1. Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950). In general, when a taxpayer is on
the cash basis, his taxable income is the aggregate of income items actually or construc-
tively received during the taxable year in cash or its equivalent. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-
1(c) (1) (i), 1.451-1 (a). Under the accrual method, income must be reported when all
the events have occurred which fix the right to receive income and the amount can be
ascertained with reasonable accuracy. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446(c) (2) ; Treas.
Reg. 88 1.446-1 (c) (ii), 1.451-1 (a).
2. The installment method is optional. Joseph Frost, 37 B.T.A. 190 (1938), acq.,
1938-2 Cum. BuLL. 13; G.C.M. 3350, VII-1 Cum. BuLL. 62 (1928).
3. Under the installment method, if the payments received in the year of sale do
not exceed 30 per cent of the selling price, the taxpayer may report only that proportion
of his gain on the installment payments actually received during the taxable year which
the total gross profit to be realized bears to the total contract price, thereby spreading
his gain over the life of the contract. INT. REv. CoDE op 1954, § 453.
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payment method of reporting income.' The rules have developed by
judicial interpretation of the Commissioner's regulations concerning
section 1001 (b) of the 1954 Code and similar provisions in the prior
law.' Under section 1001 when a taxpayer sells property and payment
is extended over more than one taxable year, the payments in cash and
property having a fair market value received by the seller are applied
against and reduce the basis of the property sold, and if in excess of the
basis of the property sold, the amount of the excess is taxable.' Gain or
loss is recognized when the obligations having no fair market value are
disposed of or satisfied. The amount of the gain or loss is the difference
between the reduced basis and the amount realized.'
It has been held on the basis of the Commissioner's regulations that
even an accrual basis taxpayer may compute income by the deferred-
payment method and need not report his entire gain in the year of sale.8
This view, which has been severely criticized by cases9 and scholars,"0 is
due to the Commissioner's failure to make a distinction between the
cash and accrual methods of reporting income in his regulations concern-
ing deferred-payment sales not on the installment basis.11 The deferred-
payment method is merely a descriptive term for reporting income on the
cash basis. It is neither consistent nor logical to permit an accrual basis
taxpayer to adopt the cash basis in the case of sales of real property.
The holding in C. W. Titus" destroys the distinction between the cash and
accrual basis of reporting income from the sale of real property. Harold
4. See Comment, Tax Aspects of Installment Sales, 23 TENx. L. REv. 302, 311
(1954).
5. MONTGOmERY'S FEDERAL TAXES § 10.3 (37th ed. 1958).
6. Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191, 193 (1938) ; Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S.
404 (1931); Victor B. Gilbert, 6 T.C. 10 (1946) ; G.C.M. 1387, VI-1 Cgum. BULL. 48
(1927). The problem of whether the purchaser's obligations received in lieu of cash have
a fair market value has been a fertile source of litigation. If the obligations of the
purchaser have no fair market value, they do not constitute income to the seller.
Burnet v. Logan, supra; Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929) ; Harold
W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950) ; Bella Hommell, 7 T.C. 992 (1946); J. W. Perry,
4 T.C.M. 14 (1945); Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941) ; Cambria Development
Co., 34 B.T.A. 1155 (1946); Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935); Ravlin Corp.,
19 B.T.A. 1112 (1930) ; Woodmar Realty Co., 17 B.T.A. 88 (1929) ; Charles C. Ruprecht,
16 B.T.A. 919 (1929); Leroy G. Evans, 5 B.T.A. 806 (1926).
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001.
8. C. W. Titus, 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936), nonacq., XV-1 Cum. BULL. 46 (1936).
9. George L. Castner Co., 30 T.C. 1061 (1958); Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C.
560 (1950).
10. Desmond, Sales of Property Under the Deferred Payment Method, 32 TAXES
40 (1954) ; Comment, 23 TEINN. L. REv. 302 (1954).
11. E.g., G.C.M. 3350, VII-1 Cum. BULL. 62 (1928) and G.C.M. 1387, VI-1
Cum. BULL. 48 (1927), which indicate the Commissioner will treat deferred-payment
sales of land in the same manner, regardless of the method of accounting used by the
taxpayer.
12. 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936).
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I1". Johnston1" indicates a more realistic approach and leaves the Titus4
case on doubtful ground. The essence of the accrual basis is to report
income as earned. When the accrual basis taxpayer has acquired a legal
right to income, he must report his gain on the sale of property. Accrual
accounting requires the seller to report his income in the year the sale is
closed and the obligation to pay becomes fixed. 5 Thus, the rules which
allow the reporting of income by the deferred-payment method should
not apply to an accrual basis taxpayer, who must report his entire gain
in the year of sale.'"
When a taxpayer is on the cash basis, no income from the sale of
land is reported until payments received in cash or property (other than
cash) exceed his basis." In general, taxable income is the aggregate
amount of payments actually or constructively received during the taxable
year in cash or its equivalent."5 Payments are constructively received
when they become available to the taxpayer without restrictions, even
though they are not actually collected until a subsequent period. 9 An
acute problem has developed concerning under what circumstances the
taxpayer will be held to have received property which is the "equivalent
of cash."
The purchaser's obligation to make deferred payments may be repre-
sented by promissory notes, a bond, a mortgage or a mere contractual
promise to pay. Where the seller receives notes or a mortgage there
seems to be no problem. If these are negotiable instruments having a
value at or near their face amount, they are treated as the equivalent of
cash. -0 Where the obligation of the purchaser is represented solely by a
bare contract right, however, with no other evidences of indebtedness
much confused litigation has resulted. The Commissioner has long taken
the position that only in rare and unusual cases do obligations of the
purchaser have no fair market value.' The courts, however, have not
been uniform in their holdings and have failed to lay down proper and
certain guides for the determination of fair market value. In most cases
13. 14 T.C. 560 (1950).
14. C. W. Titus, 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936).
15. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c) (ii), 1.451-1(a) (1957).
16. George L. Castner Co., 30 T.C. 1061 (1958); Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C.
560 (1950).
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(a), (b); G.C.M. 1387, VI-1 Cum. BULL. 48
(1927); John B. Atkins, 9 B.T.A. 140, 150 (1927).
18. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c) (ii), 1.451-1(a) (1957).
19. Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483, 490-91 (1st Cir. 1948); MONTGOMERY'S
FEDERAL TAXES § 8.18 (37th ed. 1958).
20. W. D. Cline, 15 B.T.A. 934 (1929), acq., VIII-2 Cum. BULL. 10 (1929).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1957); Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 15;
G.C.M. VIT-1 Cum. BULL. 62 (1928); G.C.M. 1387, VI-1 Cum. BULL. 48 (1927).
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the courts have refused to decide, as a matter of law, that a bare contract
can have a fair market value,2 and it has never been held, as a matter of
law, that a bare contract has an ascertainable fair market value.23 It has
been held as a matter of law, however, that an obligation, evidenced by a
mere promise to pay incorporated in a contract with no notes, mortgage
or other evidence of indebtedness, has no fair market value and cannot
be recognized as the equivalent of cash.24 In deciding the question as one
of fact, however, the courts have developed a conflict in determining the
fair market value of a bare contractual promise to make payments in the
future.2"
The courts, in an effort to rationalize their opinions on the basis
of a definite test, have adopted the "closed transaction"26 as the taxable
event to determine the year of inclusion of gain in taxable income.2" If
a completed contract of sale is made by a responsible purchaser and is a
type ordinarily dealt in, it may have a fair market value which will be
treated as the equivalent of cash, despite the absence of notes or
mortgages.2" On the other hand, it has been held, as a matter of fact, that
a bare executory contract to sell containing a provision for payment
of a sum of money in the future has no fair market value.2" The
absence of notes or other readily salable obligations is strong evidence
of lack of marketability." The mere signing of an executory contract
22. Bella Hommell, 7 T.C. 992 (1946); J. W. Perry, 4 T.C.M. 14 (1945).
23. But cf. Frank S. Cowden, 32 T.C. 853 (1959), noted in, 59 CoLUm. L. R v.
1237 (1959).
24. Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929) ; Harold W. Johnston, 14
T.C. 560 (1950).
25. Bella Hommell, 7 T.C. 992 (1946) ; Trust No. 5522, 27 B.T.A. 1250 (1933),
rev'd on other grounds, 83 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1936); Rapid Transit Land Sales Co.,
20 B.T.A. 608 (1930), acq., X-1 Cum. BULL. 54 (1931).
26. There is a completed contract of sale and the transaction is generally considered
closed when title has passed or when possession is surrendered by the seller so that
dominion and control pass, resulting in transfer of the benefits and burdens of owner-
ship to the purchaser, even though title has not passed. Union Pac. R.R., 32 B.T.A.
383, aff'd 86 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1936); MONTGO MERY'S FEDERAL TAXES § 10.2 (37th ed.
1958). In the absence of the transfer of either title or possession, there is a mere
executory contract to sell. Cf. C.L. Starr, 9 B.T.A. 886 (1927).
27. 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION § 12.03 (1955).
28. Trust No. 5522, 27 B.T.A. 1250 (1933), rev'd on other grounds, 83 F.2d 801
(9th Cir. 1936) ; Rapid Transit Land Sales Co., 20 B.T.A. 608 (1930), acq., X-1 Cum.
BULL. 54 (1931); Gertrude H. Sweet, 8 B.T.A. 404 (1927), acq., VII-1 Cum. BULL. 30
(1928) ; W. B. Geary, 6 B.T.A. 1109 (1927).
29. Cambria Development Co., 34 B.T.A. 1155 (1936); Ravlin Corp., 19 B.T.A.
1112 (1930); Woodmar Realty Co., 17 B.T.A. 88 (1929); C. L. Starr, 9 B.T.A. 886
(1927).
30. Laughlin v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1940); Bedell v. Com-
missioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929); 3. D. Amend, 13 T.C. 178 (1949), acq., 1950-1
Cum. BULL. 1; Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941), nonacq., 1950-2 Cum. BULL.
5; C. W. Titus, 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936), nonacq., XV-1 Cum. BULL. 46 (1936).
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to sell property in the future does not result in current taxable income to
the seller, whether he is on the cash basis3 or the accrual basis." If the
sale is not a closed transaction, no gain is realized until the amounts
actually received exceed the basis of the property sold." In Bedell v.
Commissioner,'4 it was held that a contract for the sale of realty was not
property with a present market value on the ground that there was not
a closed transaction. The contract was conditional because title was not
to pass until final payment. I. W. Perr" followed the Bedell case and
held a contract for deferred payments had no fair market value because
the contract was merely executory, despite substantial testimony as to its
value and a finding that the contract actually might have been sold.
Where there is a closed transaction and the only act remaining to
be done is payment by the purchaser, the earlier cases have concluded,
even where the taxpayer was on a cash basis, that deferred payments
represented only by a contract obligation have a fair market value and
gain must be reported in the year of sale.' In Old Colony Trust Co., 7
the court found a fair market value despite uncontroverted evidence by
the taxpayer that even though the purchaser had a good credit standing
no banker would discount the contract because of its non-negotiable
character. Harold W. Johnston"' refused to follow these cases in spite
of the fact that they could not be distinguished, saying they were in-
correctly decided and concluded that such a contract has no fair market
value as a matter of law. To consider the contract as an "amount
realized"" and that it has a fair market value to the seller equal to the
balance of the purchase price is contrary to the cash method of reporting
income. This type of transaction demonstrates the difference between
the cash and accrual methods."0 A simple contract to make payments in
the future creates accounts payable by the purchaser and accounts receiv-
able by the seller, which each would accrue if they were reporting income
by the accrual method of accounting. But such an agreement has no tax
significance to either the purchaser or the seller if he is on the cash basis,
31. C. L. Starr, 9 B.T.A. 886 (1927).
32. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930); J. T. Wurtsbaugh,
8 T.C. 183 (1947).
33. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); United States v. Christine Oil & Gas
Co., 269 Fed. 458, 459-60 (W.D. La. 1920).
34. 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929).
35. 4 T.C.M. 14 (1945).
36. Harry C. Moir, 14 B.T.A. 23 (1928), nonacq., VIII-1 Cu. BULL. 57 (1929);
Old Colony Trust Co., 12 B.T.A. 1334 (1928).
37. 12 B.T.A. 1334 (1928).
38. 14 T.C. 560 (1950).
39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b).
40. Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560, 565 (1950).
NOTES 219
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
regardless of when the sale becomes final and completed.4 Under the
Code 2 a taxpayer is free to report income in any manner which is con-
sistent with his method of accounting. A method of accounting is the
procedure employed to determine the income of a particular period."' Its
function is to determine to which accounting period income and expenses
are to be assigned.44 The taxpayer's method of accounting has been the
criterion for the computation of income for more than forty years."
A taxpayer who keeps no books must report on the cash basis,4" and
under the cash basis a taxpayer is required to report income only when he
receives cash or its equivalent and can take deductions only when expenses
are paid." It makes no difference to a cash basis taxpayer when the
transaction is closed. The sale has no tax significance to either the seller
or the purchaser, if he is on the cash basis, regardless of when the sale
becomes final and completed. The transaction creates accounts receivable
by the seller and accounts payable by the purchaser which each would
accrue if he were reporting income on the accrual method. But the agree-
ment to pay the balance of the purchase price in deferred payments
extending over several years has no tax significance to either the seller
or the purchaser if he is using the cash method.48 If a cash basis taxpayer
is required to report as income the promise of future payment due him
under a legally binding obligation, he is being forced to report income
in a manner inconsistent with his method of accounting, which is prohibit-
ed by the Code.4" Thus we see that the "closed transaction" test of when
to report income has become a judicial concept adopted in violation of the
statutory mandate as applied to cash basis taxpayers. The question of
when a taxpayer is to report income should in the first instance depend
on his method of accounting.
The courts have recognized that the taxpayer's method of accounting
is the primary test for determining when to report income.5" In Helvering
41. Ibid.
42. NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 451.
43. 1 NEWLOVE & GARNER, ADVANCED ACCOUNTING 403 (1951).
44. Stern Bros., 13 B.T.A. 1192, 1193 (1928) ; Clarence Shock, 1 B.T.A. 518, 530
(1925) ; LASSER, TAX ACCOUNTING METHODS 2 (1951).
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446 and similar provision in prior laws. See, Hahn,
Methods of Accounting: Their Role In The Federal Income Tax Law, 1960 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 1, 17 n. 100 (1960).
46. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(a).
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 451; Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (i) (1957).
48. Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560, 565 (1950) ; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-5 INT.
REV. BULL. 17, 20.
49. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446.
50. Helvering v. Nibley-Mimnaugh Lumber Co., 70 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1934);
Hahn, op. cit. supra, note 45.
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v. Nibley-Mimnaugh Lumber Co.,5 the court held that delivery of posses-
sion of the property and the unconditional obligation of the purchaser
constituted a closed transaction and were sufficient to require accrual of
the entire purchase price by the seller in the year the contract was
executed. The court said, however, if the seller were on the cash basis of
reporting income, a different situation would exist and a different prin-
ciple would be applicable. The fact that there was a contract of sale
resulting in a closed transaction did not bear on the determination of
when there was reportable income. Since the cash received in the year
the contract was executed did not exceed the taxpayer's basis of the
property sold, there was no gain until the subsequent year when the full
purchase price was received in negotiable notes, which had a fair market
value and were the equivalent of cash. On the basis of this analysis, the
court properly remanded the case to determine the taxpayer's method of
accounting.
Thus, if a taxpayer is on the accrual basis he must report all income
as it is earned, regardless of when payment is to be made." When a
contract has been executed and the rights and obligations of the parties
have become fixed, the transaction is closed and any gain must be accrued
at that time. 3 However, when a taxpayer is on the cash basis the emphasis
must by necessity switch from the status of the contract to the date of
payment. Under the cash. basis the date of payment is the taxable event,
not the fixation of the obligation to make and the corresponding right to
receive payment. Only when the taxpayer has received payment in cash
(or other property), including property which is the equivalent of cash
should the taxpayer be required to report his gain. Only marketable
tangible property and negotiable intangible property should be regarded
as the equivalent of cash.54 A bare contractual promise to pay, whether
a "contract to sell" or a "contract of sale," not being negotiable, should
not be regarded as the equivalent of cash. It seems absurd to say that
such a contract is the equivalent of cash, or to even regard such a contract
as property." A contract for deferred payments without any negotiable
51. 70 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
52. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(ii), 1.451-1(a) (1957); MONTGOMERY'S FEDERAL
TAXES § 8.10 (37th ed. 1958).
53. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930); Frost Lumber In-
dustries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Commissioner v. Union
Pac. R.R., 86 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Commissioner v. North Jersey Title Ins. Co.,
79 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1935); J. T. Wurtsbaugh, 8 T.C. 183 (1947); Ohio Brass Co.,
17 B.T.A. 1199 (1929).
54. Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929) ; Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C.
465 (1951); Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950); Edward J. Hudson, 11 T.C.
1042 (1948).
55. Bedell v. Commissioner, supra, note 54.
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evidence of indebtedness is analogous to a mere account receivable which
has never been regarded as the equivalent of cash."
In Niua J. Emis,7 the court held that a bare contract obligation was
not property which is the equivalent of cash, and there was no taxable
income to the cash basis taxpayer in the year of sale. The Emnis case
does not mention fair market value but states that an obligation to make
periodic deferred payments cannot be the "equivalent of cash" unless it is
freely negotiable, so that it readily passes from hand to hand in com-
merce.58 This decision is in accord with the cash basis of reporting income.
If contract obligations to make deferred payments are considered to
be the equivalent of cash, or at least until the taxpayer proves to the
contrary, 9 the distinction between the cash and accrual methods of report-
ing income will become so narrowed that it will finally disappear. The
attempt of the Commissioner to require a land contract to be treated the
same as a mortgage" results in an undue hardship to the cash basis tax-
payer. The taxpayer is required to pay taxes on a gain, before he has
fully recovered his basis, where he has received no consideration out of
which these taxes can be paid. The contract should not be recognized
as income since it does not represent property which is available for the
payment of the tax which would be imposed on the transaction. 1 Salary
received in the current year for services rendered in a prior year is income
in the current year to a recipient on the cash basis. 2 Dividends declared
is one year and received by a cash basis taxpayer in a subsequent year
are income in the-year of receipt.63 Advance rental payments are also
income in the year of receipt, regardless of when earned.64 A professional
56. Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935) ; Charles C. Ruprecht, 16 B.T.A.
919 (1929) ; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-5 INT. REV. BULL. 17, 20; MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 11.06 (1955).
57. 17 T.C. 465 (1951).
58. Compare Frank S. Cowden, 32 T.C. 853 (1959), in which it is difficult to
determine whether the court decided that the taxpayer had realizable income on the basis
of "constructive receipt" or "cash equivalent." See also Alice G. K. Kleberg, 43
B.T.A. 277 (1941).
59. See Frank S. Cowden, supra, note 58.
60. See, e.g., dissenting opinion in Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951).
61. Garber v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1931) ; Commissioner v.
Moore, 48 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1931). See Desmond, Sales of Property Under the
Deferred-Payment Method, 32 TAXES 40, 45 (1954).
62. Jackson v. Smietanka, 272 Fed. 970 (7th Cir. 1921); C. Florian Zittel, 12
B.T.A. 675 (1928); Iver J. Boyum, 7 B.T.A. 1084 (1927); E. F. Cremin, 5 B.T.A.
1164, 1169 (1927) ; J. M. Edmunds, 1 B.T.A. 998 (1925).
63. Kales v. Woodworth, 32 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1929) ; Dodge v. United States, 64
Ct. Cl. 178 (1927).
64. Andrew 3. Pembroke, 23 B.T.A. 1176 (1931); A. F. Schiro, Inc., 20 B.T.A.
1026 (1930) ; O'Day Investment Co., 13 B.T.A. 1230 (1928). See also S. P. Freeling,
7 B.T.A. 1238 (1927).
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person on a cash basis, who renders services which are represented by
contracts of various kinds, could possibly sell those accounts, but it is
generally considered that he has no taxable income until it is actually
realized, either by collection on the contract or sale of it.65 There is no
logical or legal basis for requiring a cash basis taxpayer to apply a rule
in computing his gain on the sale of real property different from the
method he uses in all his other transactions."
THE DECLINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN INDIANA
Sovereign immunity from tort liability is a subject that has received
more than its share of space and attention by legal writers. Indeed, more
than 200 separate articles and notes dealing with this archaic principle
have appeared in the various law reviews and legal periodicals over the
past sixty years.' In 1935, an article concerned specifically with the tort
liability of a municipal corporation in Indiana appeared in the Indiana
Law Journal,' and again, in 1948, the same publication carried a note
which extensively summarized the law of governmental immunity in
general in Indiana.3 It would therefore be duplicitious to undertake again
at this time a general discussion of the cases and law which are treated
at length in the above two works. However, a recent Supreme Court
of Indiana case, Flowers v. Board of Comm'rs, ' in expressly over-
ruling prior Indiana authority necessitates a renewed analysis of im-
munity in this state and the effect the Flowers decision may have on that
doctrine.
Indiana, along with the majority of other jurisdictions has long
sustained the state's immunity from tort liability. There are numerous
decisions upholding the immunity of the state and its institutions. 6
65. See text accompanying note 56, supra.
66. Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950).
1. Illustrative are Davis, Tort Liability Of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. RzE.
752 (1956); Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability Of The States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1363 (1954); and see Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939).
2. Chattin, Tort Liability Of Municipal Corporations it Indiana, 10 IND. L.J.
329 (1935).
3. See Note, Governmental Tort Liability Ii Indiana, 23 IND. L.J. 468 (1948).
4. 168 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1960).
5. For an exhaustive summary of the law in each state see Leflar and Kantrowitz,
Tort Liability Of The States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1363 (1954).
6. See e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Bracht
v. Conservation Comm'rs, 118 Ind. App. 77, 76 N.E.2d 848 (1948) ; State v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 175 Ind. 59, 93 N.E. 213 (1910).
